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What happens with writers is if you say 
something bad about them, and it seems wise 
and fair, their feelings are hurt, but they’re not 
mad at you because writers are too serious to be 
mad at you when you tell the truth. 





A text as baffling as John Gardner’s polemical 
manifesto, On Moral Fiction (1978), demands 
attention and forbids indifference. Gardner 
died young — but he lived long enough to see 
his career demolished after the publication of 
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1  John Gardner, “Interview with John Gardner, 
English Department of Pan American University 
(1981),” in Conversations with John Gardner, ed. 
Allan Chavkin (Jackson: University Press of 
Mississippi, 1990), 259. 
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that hugely unpopular book. He was vilified, 
attacked from all angles (in literary journals as 
well as on television channels like PBS), 2 
dismissed as a reactionary, and cut off from the 
literary circles he had once frequented. “I have 
not developed any enemies that I know of,”3 he 
told an interviewer a year before the motorcycle 
accident that killed him. Yet whether or not he 
made any enemies, his book was appropriated 
by unwanted new friends: because of what was 
considered his highly conservative view of art, 
Gardner was approached by evangelists like 
Jerry Falwell as well as the American Nazi 
Party.4 To this day he continues to be treated as 
a hysterical moralist even by otherwise careful 
critics like Wayne C. Booth. The pity of all of 
this is that, for its many flaws, On Moral Fiction 
is a book that deserves to be read, to be taken 
seriously, even to be read morally, as Gardner 
would have put it. My aim, then, is to accept, 
however briefly, this neglected challenge, and to 
take Gardner as he wanted to be taken. If he is 
doomed to literary oblivion, he has at least 
earned a proper funeral, attended by one or two 
friends who tried to understand. 
 The relationship between morality and art, 
of course, has been debated in various ways 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2  Barry Silesky, John Gardner: Literary Outlaw 
(Chapel Hill: Algonquin, 2004), 254. 
3 Gardner, “Interview with the English Department 
of Pan American University,” 259. 
4 Silesky, John Gardner: Literary Outlaw, 256. 
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across the centuries, and Gardner’s contri-
bution to the conversation is decidedly old-
fashioned. It is also resolutely difficult to make 
much sense out of this contribution. Doubtless, 
Gardner is passionate in his insistence that 
there is an ineradicable link between well-
crafted fiction and a kind of heightened moral 
awareness. The problem, as I see it, is that by 
trying to be polemical instead of quietly 
effective, Gardner puts off potential allies and 
categorically misreads certain other novelists to 
make a point. He rejects almost all the fiction of 
his own time (he was working on this text in 
the mid-to-late 1970s) as somehow too clever 
or nihilistic or immoral, whatever that term has 
come to mean by the end of his book. 
 But suppose there is in fact an important 
message to be conveyed: that the most 
enduring works of fiction, those that “mean 
something” to readers of many generations, are 
those whose construction entails a kind of 
moral courage — what then? If most modern 
fiction is lacking in the way Gardner describes, 
then what can be done about it? The answer 
must partly be sought in Gardner’s manifesto 
itself. It must also come from outside, from a 
careful preliminary formalization of the 
argument he puts forth that would resolve 
inconsistencies or remove them, and ignore the 
petty name-calling that constitutes whole 
chunks of the book. 
 To formalize, or theorize, John Gardner may 
4 JOHN GARDNER: A TINY EULOGY 
!
!
be to go against his wishes. Gardner is not a 
theorist. On Moral Fiction makes clear Gardner’s 
distaste for grand theories that cannibalize 
other texts for self-confirmation. No room, in 
Gardner’s view, for critics whose objectives lie 
in the explanation of literary pyrotechnics. “In 
all the arts, our criticism is for the most part 
inhumane,” he claims. “We are rich in schools 
which speak of how art ‘works’ and avoid the 
whole subject of what work it ought to do.”5 The 
work it ought to do, as Gardner conceives it, is 
not always clearly explained. “The traditional 
view is that true art is moral: it seeks to 
improve life, not debase it. It seeks to hold off, 
at least for a while, the twilight of the gods and 
us” (5). These are grandiose words, and it 
cannot be doubted, on the evidence to be found 
in the pages of his manifesto, that Gardner is 
anything but serious. After all, art is “essentially 
serious and beneficial, a game played against 
chaos and death, against entropy” (6). Gardner 
is never totally precise in his formulation of 
what moral art should be, but we know that it 
“asserts and reasserts those values which hold 
off dissolution, struggling to keep the mind 
intact and preserve the city, the mind’s safe 
preserve.” And lastly: “Art rediscovers, 
generation by generation, what is necessary to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 John Gardner, On Moral Fiction (New York: Basic 
Books, 2000), 16 (hereafter cited parenthetically in 
my text, by page number). 
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humanness” (6).  
 What we are left with, by the time the first 
and most conventionally theoretical section of 
On Moral Fiction is over, is a collection of 
aphoristic glances into the eyes of the One True 
God of Moral Fiction. This is not merely ironic 
mockery — for it is never quite clear whether 
Gardner is hiding, in one of his pockets, a secret 
affinity to God and all that the word entails. 
Certainly “God” is a character in this book. So is 
“Truth.” And those other obvious secondary 
characters, “Beauty” and “Goodness,” also make 
their appearances. As for the protagonist, we 
have two possibilities. Either the hero of 
Gardner’s tale is “Art,” making “Morality” a 
mere sidekick — or it is the other way around. 
It is not always easy to tell where the stress 
falls. Sometimes Gardner seems simply to 
equate “good art” with “moral art.” Sometimes, 
however, art as a whole is more like the father 
of a family of various troublesome or virtuous 
offspring: the black sheep of cynical 
postmodernism (Thomas Pynchon), the clumsy 
but deeply sincere eldest son (William 
Faulkner), the smart aleck or braggart (William 
Gass). In this scenario, Father Art is waiting for 
the prodigal child he has called Moral Fiction, 
the missing piece of the puzzle that would set 
the literary world right once and for all. Moral 
fiction is adventurous, not always obedient, and 
sometimes disappears from sight. But it is 
moral fiction that Gardner believes we need. 
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 The purpose of my little “eulogy” is not to do 
John Gardner a favor and redeem his name. 
The impetus behind this is a conviction that the 
criticisms we can aim at Gardner (as a man, 
critic, novelist, thinker) are all too often 
diversionary. Nobody needs to approve of his 
methods or his bullying, or indeed to pay any 
attention to him as an intellectual at all, so long 
as his message is taken into account. And his 
message is a familiar but seemingly unpopular 
one: “What fiction does at its very best is test 
out values. . . . A good book leads to a great 
affirmation.”6 The belief that novels matter, not 
only as works of art, but also as experiments in 
which basic values to which we cling can be 
tested in safety, may seem unfashionable today, 















6 Silesky, John Gardner: Literary Outlaw, 254. 





b Gardner, Art and Philosophy 
 
Whatever moral fiction is, it is clearly not just 
another way of giving beauty and goodness the 
same ontological status. At no point does 
Gardner appear to claim that what is beautiful 
is by necessity also moral. In fact the purely 
aesthetic side of art, which according to a 
commonsense view might be the most 
important aspect, is sometimes conspicuously 
missing from Gardner’s argument. He does 
write of the Beautiful, and we will look later at 
his treatment of this concept; but for the most 
part, “Gardnerian” moral fiction prizes some-
thing other than beauty-as-such.  
 “Art probes,” Gardner tells us. “It stalks like 
a hunter lost in the woods, listening to itself 
and to everything around it, unsure of itself, 
waiting to pounce” (9). This probing is key. 
Serious art, Gardner seems to imply, is trying to 
find its way in the darkness into which we as a 
collective have allowed ourselves to slip. “Art is 
as original and important as it is precisely 
because it does not start out with a clear 
knowledge of what it means to say” (13). There 
is more: “Art, in sworn opposition to chaos, 
discovers by its process what it can say. That is 
art’s morality. Its full meaning is beyond 
paraphrase” (14). One understands, then, that 
the process is part of the truth of moral art. 
8 JOHN GARDNER: A TINY EULOGY 
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When Hegel, in the Preface to his Phenome-
nology, warns against seeing the truth of 
philosophy as somehow separable from the 
processes that lead us to it, he is arguing much 
the same thing, if we substitute “moral art” for 
“philosophy”: “Whatever might be appropriately 
said about philosophy — say, a historical 
statement of the main drift and the point of 
view, the general content and results, a string 
of random assert-ions and assurances about 
truth — none of this can be accepted as the way 
in which to expound philosophical truth.”7 For 
all of his criticisms of philosophy’s methods, 
Gardner is a Hegelian in this aspect. “Art,” let us 
recall, “discovers by its process what it can say,” 
and, indeed, its full meaning is “beyond 
paraphrase” (14). 
 Gardner, however, is unkind to the modern 
philosopher. “Philosophy is more concerned 
with coherence than with what William James 
called life’s ‘buzzing, blooming confusion’” (9). 
And: “Structuralists, formalists, linguistic philo-
sophers who tell us that works of art are like 
trees — simply objects for perception — all 
avoid on principle the humanistic questions: 
who will this work of art help?” Unfortunately, 
“The business of criticism has become 
definition, morality reduced to the positivist 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Georg W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, 
trans. Arthur V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977), 1. 
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ideal of clarity” (17). If fiction needs to be made 
moral, so does criticism. The two go hand-in-
hand. In fact, “like theology and religion,” art 
and criticism “are basically companions but not 
always friends. At times they may be enemies” 
(8). They cannot be separated, but they needn’t 
always get along. 
 Thus it would seem that Gardner wishes to 
do different things in On Moral Fiction. He 
wants to set a course for fiction writers here; 
but over there, he has in mind the task of the 
critic. On one page his goal is nothing less than 
to slash and burn everything he finds repre-
hensible. The next page he is less belligerent. 
His arguments are confused and at time 
confusing. One suspects, when reading his book 
for the first time, that Gardner is setting 
standards he wouldn’t be able to reach in his 
own work; yet those standards are never 
explicitly formulated. They are not theorized. 
This is in keeping with his style, his beliefs and 
the message of his tract, but it is also a good 
way to leave a reader frustrated. Perhaps 
theorizing is totally beside the point — it 
would, in any case, radically transform 
Gardner’s message, as one of his subtlest 
insights concerns the dynamism of the written 
word. To theorize would be to run the risk of 
being over-schematic already; in a sense it 
would be moralistic, a way of universalizing a 
set of rules for writing fiction that could help us 
to live morally.  
10 JOHN GARDNER: A TINY EULOGY 
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 The paradox is that Gardner seems both for 
and against this universality. On the one hand 
the values he champions would stand the test 
of time: true works of art “exert their civilizing 
influence century after century, long after the 
cultures that produced them have decayed” 
(105). This implies a set of standards to which 
“humanity” might adhere over the millennia. 
The fate of Achilles or the Karamazovs is, in 
this view, an eternally relatable fate. Dos-
toevsky’s Russia is no more, and Homer lived 
centuries before Aristotle first laid out his own 
important rules for poetry and drama; and yet, 
for someone like Gardner, their works have 
endured because they were moral, because 
these authors were grappling with eternal 
truths.  
 On the other hand, Gardner is not so bold as 
to write out exactly what an eternal truth might 
be, what the substance of an enduring work 
might look like. A universal work might very 
well follow immutable laws, but these laws are 
not mere givens. They must be worked towards, 
on the assumption that with enough 
intellectual integrity and moral curiosity, their 
invisible presence will guide the work to its 
moral beauty. We are back to philosophy; “at its 
best fiction is . . . a way of thinking, a 
philosophical method” (107). 
 Probing and poking at cultural, intellectual 
and moral values is part of being an artist. 
Gardner evidently cherishes this aspect of the 
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human inclination to art. Although there is an 
understandable prejudice among academics 
against writing books like On Moral Fiction 
because of their perceived anti-intellectualism, 
the fact is that Gardner never discourages 
intellectual or philosophical streaks in novels 
just for the sake of it. Undoubtedly a careless 
reading of On Moral Fiction could leave someone 
convinced that Gardner dislikes Saul Bellow and 
Thomas Pynchon because of their erudition. 
But that would, indeed, be a careless reading. 
Ideas are important for Gardner, but they must 
be used in specific ways. “A really good book 
tests ideas,”8 as he says, and the goal of On 
Moral Fiction appears to be to show the best 
attitude to adopt when testing ideas. 
 It seems clear that to make sense of 
Gardner’s book as whole, we need to be clear 
what he thinks he is saying — that is, to try 
grasping what moral fiction might have meant 
to Gardner the renegade theorist-novelist. The 
difficulty lies in the looseness with which he 
defines certain terms central to his argument. 
Yet, because we are set on taking Gardner 
seriously, we should perhaps attempt to tighten 
and delimit the concepts he presents as crucial 
to the message of On Moral Fiction. Much of 
this work will appear to be highly critical of 
Gardner. However, the criticisms are leveled at 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8  John Gardner, qtd. in Silesky, John Gardner: 
Literary Outlaw, 254. 
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b THEORIZING THE GOOD 
 
Moral fiction strives for the Good, the True, 
and the Beautiful. Yet these are not things “that 
exist in the way llamas do, but values which 
exist when embodied and, furthermore, 
recognized as embodied” (133). Gardner defines 
these values metaphorically, elliptically, neg-
atively. Let us look at the Good and the True in 
particular — the Beautiful is insufficiently 
developed in Gardner’s book and he seems to 
take for granted that we know precisely what he 
means by it. 
 To start with the Good, it “cannot be app-
roached except by imagination because our 
understanding of it arises out of our experience 
of an infinite number of particular situations” 
(140). Gardner’s concern is with promoting the 
Good through fiction. He takes as his model the 
relationships between adults that we might call 
healthy: “Healthy relationships between adults 
are characterized by sympathy and trust and 
are supported on both sides by maturity” (136). 
Gardner is implying, as I read it, that healthy 
adult relationships need not all be the exact 
same — but they are structured in a certain 
way, and this structure’s foundation is made of 
trust, sympathy, and other commonsensically 
virtuous ideas. We do not have to be aware at 
all times of how the structure of a relationship 
14 JOHN GARDNER: A TINY EULOGY 
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determines that relationship’s development. All 
that is needed is for the structure to be in place, 
so that the relationship might blossom. If this 
is Gardner’s point — that certain psychological 
elements must be in place as conditions for a 
healthy relationship — then the first thing to 
point out is that as an illustration this is too 
elaborate to be particularly enlightening. Moral 
fiction is fiction that puts in place (or, 
structures) the necessary conditions for the 
reader to decide, on their own, to be moral. 
Rather than preach, it leads by example: it 
shows us characters struggling to make the 
right choice in difficult situations; it shows us 
characters we should wish to emulate. It is 
heavily metaphorical; it stands for a multiplicity 
of human experiences. That is one way to begin 
to theorize the Good: it is normative to the 
extent that it presents us with ways of thinking 
about moral issues, ways of behaving morally 
— by choice. The moral content of any 
particular text is not as important as the very 
fact that the text is morally structured. We will 
return to the idea of a moral structure soon. 
 The Good “presents a goal for the human 
condition here in this world, a conceptual 
abstraction of our actual experience of 
moments of good in human life; it is the 
essential subject of all literature, even of a strict 
imagist poem which asserts nothing but the 
value of seeing, but not all literature illustrates 
it: badly thought out literature obscures it, and 
PHIL JOURDAN 15 
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nihilistic literature perniciously denies it” (136). 
It is not controversial to assume, given 
Gardner’s pronouncements on the Good, that 
whatever “nihilistic literature” is, it aligns itself 
with evil. The implicit opposition here between 
good and evil places the discussion in a quasi-
religious frame. Perhaps “mystical” is more 
appropriate, since there is an element of 
wonderment at the power of art peppered 
throughout Gardner’s text. More precisely, 
there seems to be a core that is totally 
inassimilable in great art, something we cannot 
symbolize — an aspect beyond what the critic 
or even the artist can claim about the artwork. 
This mystical kernel lurking within or behind 
the artwork, of course, must remain an enigma. 
It also makes the task of making sense of 
Gardner more difficult.  
 The Good in art appears to belong to the in-
communicable realm of intuitions, inferences, 
transcendence. It informs the most intimately 
subjective level of experience — “deep 
experience,” as Gardner calls it (162) — and 
also reaches far beyond it, to shape more than 
just my experience or yours. It pulsates, shifts, 
but remains essentially directed at the better-
ment of human life. It resonates throughout 
the ages wearing different masks but speaking 
in the same voice. “The idea of an imperishable 
form for the Good has always been appealing, 
since it keeps the Good from changing with 
governments and hair styles; but actually we 
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need not invent ghosts to keep things relatively 
stable” (137). 
 The Good is stable because the predicament 
in which humanity finds itself does not change 
at a fundamental level. This is fair enough in 
principle, in casual conversation. It is not good 
enough, however, at a theoretical level. In fact it 
seems chimerical. It implies something 
removed from the human but subtly influenc-
ing it from the outside and the inside 
simultaneously. We can either aim for it or 
reject it, but its existence, to Gardner, is beyond 
question so long as mankind is around to 
grapple with it. “The Good is existential in the 
sense that its existence depends upon man’s” 
(137) — without man there is no good, but 
without the Good man is maladjusted, 
misshapen. What this amounts to is a 
conception of the human as inseparable from 
humanity’s values. This in itself is not a unique 
perspective, but something seems confused in 
the argument. The Good is enigmatic, elusive 
but always present, of man but not of man — 
what, then, is its use, except as an empty word 
Gardner uses to absorb any contradictions that 
might surface in his reasoning?  
 This is not necessarily to deny that there can 
be goodness. But the Good, as a concept, means 
everything and very little at the same time. It is 
compromised by its vagueness. The serious use 
to which Gardner puts the Good is un-
convincing. Yet a different but related problem 
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surfaces here, the problem of goodness itself — 
not morality as an abstract category, but the 
vast trove of everyday situations where a fable, 
a metaphor, a simple anecdote can lead people 
to do “the right thing,” to behave in a manner 
we can agree is good, conducive to the better-
ment of their situation.  
 We see Gardner trying to reconcile the 
impulse to goodness, the will to altruism that is 
sometimes evident in even the most selfish 
person, with the seriously complicated problem 
of justifying any action at all on purely 
philosophical grounds. In lived experience we 
encounter good-natured human beings doing 
“bad” things, and cruel individuals being “good” 
or in some way helpful to their community.  
 Gardner the writer is caught in a complex 
situation, and On Moral Fiction reads like a text 
offered by someone whose allegiance is to 
practical matters, to art as a good thing 
according to the standards of his time and 
culture. There is no categorical imperative. As 
the many quotations I have chosen demon-
strate, Gardner’s view is that we are weak but 
beautiful, and capable of deciphering for 
ourselves what a situation requires. The lack of 
universality here, the near-total absence of 
fundamental moral codes, is precisely what 
allows for moral fiction as an art form to claim 
its importance. Through the carefully chosen 
written word — through the novel written 
according to its own processes, as Gardner 
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would have it — the reader is able to learn to 
understand the author’s intentions, the 
protagonist’s choices, the story’s outcome. 
Sense, or a sense of sense, an impression of 
meaning, is generated in moral fiction. If this is 
a correct reading of Gardner’s position — that 
is, if in the end moral fiction helps and guides 
us in our daily lives but does not prescribe a 
mode of conduct — then, if nothing else, this is 
an intuitive and attractive idea. It appeals to 
the heart instead of reason, and it feels 
acceptable, at least to this reader. Sadly, 
Gardner’s position is immediately jeopardized 
by the second important force at play in the 























b THEORIZING THE TRUE 
 
“The conclusive answering of a question has to 
do not with the Good but with the True,” 
Gardner declares. “Whereas we intuit the Good, 
we approach the unattainable and thus relative 
absolute ‘Truth’ through reason” (139). To 
avoid being unfair to Gardner at the outset, let 
us point out now that he is quick to insist that 
“truth is not the highest concern of fiction” 
(141). Nevertheless, one wonders what the 
point of bringing “truth” into this is. Gardner 
brings in certain epistemological questions 
which, unsurprisingly, he does not answer in a 
satisfactory way. Although he spends little time 
dealing with the True, he dwells on it just long 
enough to make it seem like an important 
category. He defines truth as “that which can be 
known for certain, an object of reason and 
analysis” (140). More: “Absolute Truth is all 
that could be known by an omniscient mind, 
and insofar as the universe contains voluntary 
agents and a random evolution of everything 
from brute matter to conscious thought, Truth 
is relative in the same manner as is Goodness” 
(140). Whatever one makes of this, it seems 
appropriate to say that Gardner’s words imply a 
variety of enormous presuppositions of the sort 
philosophers have wrestled with for many 
centuries, and which he promptly sweeps under 
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the carpet. Setting aside the question of 
whether anything “can be known for certain” 
quite as simply as Gardner assumes, since that 
is a different debate, there is still the problem 
of the relativity of a truth that can be known 
for certain.  
 What, exactly, does Gardner mean to say 
here? Perhaps merely that if there is such a 
thing as absolute truth, we are left with no 
choice but to have it in incomplete form, since 
we are not “an omniscient mind” and cannot 
claim to know everything (let alone anything). 
Or perhaps Gardner wishes to say that through 
“reason and analysis” we might come up with 
our own interpretation of an absolute truth, 
and that this interpretation could be valid. That 
Gardner appears to treat absolute truth as a 
sort of ontological substance is problematic 
enough, or at least curiously old-fashioned; the 
matter is not helped by his reckless refusal to 
argue his way to any position of credibility. By 
the next paragraph, Gardner has moved on to 
the idea of mimesis and its relation to truth and 
to the text. But we should not follow Gardner 
too eagerly here, and must instead ask about 
the True: what has it to do with moral fiction, 
or even with what he calls moral criticism?  
 For the implication is that the True lies 
beyond “mere” morality and beyond even sub-
jective experience, relative though Gardner may 
claim it to be. The True, “that which can be 
known for certain,” presumably does not center 
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only on questions of morality; surely it would 
encompass much more than that. Indeed the 
True, as Gardner has defined it so far, would 
appear to lurk hidden in the very energy of 
human action, informing not just what we can 
do and know, but more relevantly, what is good 
and what is beautiful — it should help us 
decipher in the silence of the universe the 
judgments that we ought to make in the name 
of truth. 
 These are elementary remarks, but they are 
not even addressed by Gardner in his brief 
treatment of the True. Instead, having brought 
into the room this enormous animal, Gardner 
simply takes us into the next room and resumes 
his sermon: successful mimesis in art, “accurate 
imitation of the world” (140), can be pleasur-
able, he writes, but it is not crucial. He then 
summons up a distinction that begins, if 
tentatively, to clarify his position on the True: 
“when talking about art we use the word truth 
in two ways: to mean that which is factually 
accurate or logically valid” — the True as a limit 
to falsehood, as the perhaps unattainable cure 
for misinterpretation — and also “to mean that 
which does not feel like lying” (142). A few 
sentences later, Gardner simply stops writing 
about the True. Nevertheless, he has let out a 
clue: what he is aiming for is not so much 
“truth” as a state of accordance with what is, 
but rather a feeling of genuineness, of 
authenticity. The True, in Gardner’s naively 
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schematic view, is more than factuality. It is, 
more archaically, truthfulness. A reader should 
have a gut impression of having touched upon 
something fundamental about the world when 
reading a work of moral fiction. The True is 
manifested in our intuition that, yes, that is 
what it’s like, that what we are reading is 
handling its subject sensitively and honestly. 
Unfortunately, such a feeling is not enough to 
warrant bringing all of truth into the debate. At 
any rate, it is not enough in the sense that 
linking the True to a gut feeling that something 
“does not feel like lying” amounts to very little. 
One suspects that the True ought to have been 
left out entirely. The problem is that without 
reference to truth, moral fiction would seem to 
lose its privileged status. If part of the point of 
moral fiction is to show us new ways of tackling 
moral problems and living morally, then surely 
there are certain standards of morality to which 
fiction must strive. They may not be absolute in 
the way that the Ten Commandments are 
absolute, but nevertheless the fiction cham-
pioned by Gardner needs a set of standards if it 
is to strive towards anything except self-
relation, self-reference — that is, more than the 
logic that the fiction itself creates. 
 Yet perhaps this is the point. Perhaps the 
True, beyond the mere feeling that something is 
not a lie (a poetically interesting but in this 
context useless formulation) amounts, in 
Gardner’s schema, to a structural limit rather 
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than anything external to the text. The only 
way we can salvage the True as defined in On 
Moral Fiction is to qualify Gardner’s claim that 
the True is “that which can be known for 
certain, an object of reason and analysis” by 
adding: in the universe depicted in the fiction. 
This is a deliberate misreading. Curiously, it is 
also consistent with other statements made by 
Gardner in his work. If we accept that moral 
fiction follows its own rules to the end, or that 
it is the kind of narrative storytelling concerned 
with characters in certain situations set up by 
the author behaving in believable and under-
standable ways, then the True (as a gut feeling 
that the story’s progress is “not a lie” and as a 
reaching towards a kind of absoluteness in 
humanity’s codes and beliefs) makes some 
sense. It makes sense precisely as an “untrue 
truth” or the likeness of verisimilitude made 
possible by the novel. The True, here, can be 
seen as that which, in the logic of the fictional 
universe, seems plausible and realistic even 
though the universe depicted is a construction. 
The True, then, makes sense as the uninter-
rupted flow of what Gardner repeatedly called 
the “fictive dream” elsewhere. 
 Fiction as a dream is hardly a controversial 
notion, but Gardner places such importance on 
it that it needs to be examined to see if our 
qualification of his use of the True holds up. In 
an earlier text intended as a pedagogical 
exposition of the “art of fiction,” Gardner 
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claims that in fiction “the writer’s first job is to 
convince the reader that the events he recounts 
really happened, or to persuade the reader that 
they might have happened.”9 As soon as the 
reader accepts the terms of buying into the lie, 
he also consents to dreaming the events 
depicted as though the dream sprang from 
within his being. Good fiction writing, for 
Gardner, is writing that succeeds in main-
taining the dream’s hold on the reader until the 
end. That is good fiction; but then what is 
moral fiction? In a passage in The Art of Fiction 
anticipating the themes of On Moral Fiction, 
Gardner suggests, “fiction provides, at its best, 
trustworthy but inexpressible models. We 
ingest metaphors of good, wordlessly learning 
to behave more like Levin than Anna . . . , more 
like the transformed Emma . . . than the Emma 
we first meet in the book.”10 Crucially, he adds: 
“This subtle, for the most part wordless 
knowledge is the ‘truth’ great fiction seeks 
out.” 11  The truth explored by fiction is not 
Truth as a general, abstract, impossibly com-
plicated idea, but the unreal and fictionally 
constructed “reality” of the universe depicted in 
a novel. We do not know the Truth about this 
or that, nor can we legitimately speak about the 
Truth without a variety of complications, but 
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9 John Gardner, The Art of Fiction: Notes on Craft for 
Young Writers (New York: Vintage, 1991), 22. 
10 Gardner, The Art of Fiction, 63. 
11 Gardner, The Art of Fiction, 63. 
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for Gardner, a well-written novel reveals to us 
certain structures, rules and “truths” about its 
characters and situations. The truth inside a 
novel can thus be explained as the “unwritten” 
set of codes that make a novel internally 
consistent on its own and, by extension, 
rewarding and stimulating and “not phony” for 
the reader. 
 If this is a correct interpretation, then yes, 
the True as Gardner originally presents it in On 
Moral Fiction does have a role to play. It is 
simply not the role that Gardner thought it 
was, and sadly that is Gardner’s own 
shortcoming. We can nevertheless see that the 
True (as that network of secret rules and com-
promises dealt with by the author to ensure 
that his fiction seems convincing even when set 
in a holiday resort on another planet), even if it 
is not yet formalized or well enough explored, 
has a place in Gardner’s system. In the last 
instance, perhaps it would have been better to 
















b IS MORAL FICTION THE FICTION OF 
MORALISTS? 
 
A short essay by Milan Kundera cautions 
against simple mockery of that old-fashioned 
(one might say: reactionary) school of criticism 
capable, for example, of dismissing Madame 
Bovary as an immoral text. Immoral, that is, 
because unsafe, not pregnant with uplifting 
messages about the potential for human 
redemption. Kundera, a careful craftsman 
whose experiences with social realism in the 
arts left him desirous of something more 
honest and less prescriptive, is well placed to 
judge the merits of moralism in fiction. He 
chooses to write on Madame Bovary because 
although it is a peculiarly immoral (or amoral) 
text if one reads it for moral consolation, it is at 
the same time decidedly not a work of nihilism, 
cynicism or, indeed, profound immorality. 
However, Kundera does not lampoon the 
reactionary literati of Flaubert’s time because 
he knows the transformative power of a truly 
impressive novel. “Is it really so inappropriate 
for the most prestigious French critic of his 
time to exhort a young writer to ‘uplift’ and 
‘console’ his readers by a ‘picture of goodness,’ 
readers who deserve, as do we all, a little 
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sympathy and encouragement?” 12  No doubt 
Gardner would have been inclined to agree that 
we all deserve sympathy and encouragement as 
readers, as human beings; and granting sym-
pathy and encouragement does not have to 
mean telling people what to do. 
 When George Sand chides Flaubert (unfairly, 
one feels) with her condescending assertion 
that, “Art is not only criticism and satire”13 — 
when, that is, the moralist finds fault with a 
work like Madame Bovary because the work in 
question resists easy, ready-made moralistic 
interpretations — that is when Gardner’s 
thought becomes truly useful. Moral fiction, we 
have seen, is not the fiction of preachers and 
soapbox hogs. It does, however, pave the way 
for optimism and order. Gardner may not have 
been at his most rigorous in his discussions of 
the Good, the True, and the Beautiful, but his 
sincerity is beyond question. Art is not only 
criticism and satire, but neither, at its best, is it 
insincere, impersonal consolation. It’s easy to 
suspect, by the end of On Moral Fiction, that 
moral fiction of the Gardnerian variety is really 
little more than the kind of writing meant to 
open up possibilities for the affirmation of love 
and life. This sounds grandiose, and in a sense 
it is. It is also one of On Moral Fiction’s most 
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12 Milan Kundera, The Curtain: An Essay in Seven 
Parts, trans. Linda Asher (London: Faber and Faber, 
2007), 60. 
13 Kundera, The Curtain, 60. 
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recurrent and important themes. A look at 
some examples outside of Gardner’s text will 
show that the life-affirming potential of art, of 
which Gardner makes a great deal, is not quite 
so mystical and confused a notion as the tools 
Gardner uses to explain it. 
 A simple, effective definition of “moral 
fiction” does not emerge from Gardner’s text. It 
is, however, to be found in Kundera’s essay on 
the novel. It is Kundera who comes a bit closer 
to showing what moral fiction is. Whereas 
Gardner invokes the abstractions of the Good 
and the True and the Beautiful, and attacks 
other novelists for failing to meet standards he 
has not clearly set, Kundera’s approach is to 
show, historically, where “novelistic thinking” 
took over the writing of fiction and became its 
own category with its own codes. Flaubert, and 
after him Musil and Broch, and many others, 
became novelists who produced novels as art, 
instead of writers who happened to write 
novels. They discovered the importance of 
letting the process of “novelistic thinking” take 
over. Recall once again Gardner’s remark that 
“Art, in sworn opposition to chaos, discovers by 
its process what it can say. That is art’s 
morality.” Compare that to Kundera’s words: 
 
novelistic thinking . . . has nothing to do 
with the thinking of a scientist or a 
philosopher; I would even say it is 
purposely a-philosophic, even antiphilo-
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sophic, that is to say fiercely independent 
of any system of preconceived ideas; it 
does not judge; it does not proclaim 
truths; it questions, it marvels, it plumbs; 
its form is highly diverse: metaphoric, 
ironic, hypothetic, hyperbolic, aphoristic, 
droll, provocative, fanciful; and mainly it 
never leaves the magic circle of its 
characters’ lives; those lives feed it and 
justify it.14 
 
By now it is clear that the type of fiction we are 
dealing with is born of curiosity and wonder-
ment. The most “Gardnerian” thing about 
Kundera’s words, however, is not the attitude 
that is being privileged, but rather the absence 
of an attitude; the writer must put aside “any 
system of preconceived ideas” before writing 
his first word. The implications are many: a 
writer of fiction should not set out to prove 
something; he should not use his characters as 
vehicles for his own prejudices; he should not 
create situations only to resolve them in his 
mind before the writing has started; he should 
not, in short, have a clear idea of what he wants 
to say in his work, but ought instead to find out 
what he wants to say. The internal logic of a 
work of fiction should not depend on its 
author’s omniscience. In its broadest sense, the 
task of moral fiction is a negative one: moral 
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fiction avoids bringing the givens of the world 
into its conception. A story should not, that is, 
seek from the outset to reaffirm the values we 


































b  MORAL FICTION AND PLOT 
 
Gerard Manley Hopkins, in a letter, gives his 
opinion of Robert Louis Stevenson. It is an 
interesting opinion because it expresses many 
of the same sentiments concerning good fiction 
that we find in Gardner and Kundera: 
 
His doctrine, if I apprehend him, is 
something like this. The essence of 
Romance is incident and that only, the 
type of pure Romance of the Arabian 
Nights: those stories have no moral, no 
character-drawing, they run altogether 
on interesting incident. The incidents 
must of course have a connection, but it 
need be nothing more than that they 
happen to the same person, are aggra-
vations and so on. As history consists 
essentially of events likely or unlikely, 
consequences of causes chronicled before 
or what may be called chance, just retri-
butions or nothing of the sort, so 
Romance, which is fictitious history, 
consists of event, of incident. His own 
stories are written on this principle; they 
are very good and he has all the gifts a 
writer of fiction should have, and at first 
you notice no more than an ordinary well 
told story, but on looking back in the 
32 JOHN GARDNER: A TINY EULOGY 
!
!
light of this doctrine you see that the 
persons illustrate the incident or strains 
of incident, the plot, the story, not the 
story and incidents the persons.15 
 
“No moral, no character-drawing” and “running 
altogether on interesting incident” — in other 
words, the type of fiction that is immediately 
consumable, morally neutral, the fiction 
Gardner might have rejected as trivial on the 
grounds that it seeks to do nothing but 
entertain. Hopkins’s comments are very much 
of the variety frequently made by writers about 
fiction. Hopkins’s disapproval of fiction that 
relies on “incident and that only” pre-empts 
Gardner’s own criticisms of much fiction. 
However, it is interesting that neither Hopkins 
nor Gardner dismisses plot; only the kind of 
fiction where “the persons illustrate the 
incident or strains of incident.”  
 Gardner was happy to admit that plot is 
essential. He never treated plot as anything 
other than crucial, in fact: “Though character is 
the emotional core of great fiction, and though 
action with no meaning beyond its brute 
existence can have no lasting appeal, plot is — 
or must sooner or later become — the focus of 
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15  Gerard Manley Hopkins, The Correspondence of 
Gerard Manley Hopkins and Richard Watson Dixon, ed. 
Claude C. Abbot (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1935), 114. 
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every good writer’s plan.”16 Plot is not an enemy 
of moral fiction. The structure, the pace and the 
chronological sequence in a novel are all 
important, and Gardner never says anything to 
the contrary. But they should not be ends in 
themselves; they should, rather, be the means 
used to show a reader what a character is 
capable of. The plot should bring out the life of 
the novel, force its characters to move and 
speak and make decisions. Of course, a plot 
does not need to be extraordinarily elaborate to 
achieve this, nor does it have to be terribly 
riveting from the start. What matters is that 
the plot is used to give the novel a reason to 
move forward. “We can enjoy a story that has 
some secret logic we sense but cannot im-
mediately guess; but if we begin to suspect that 
the basis of profluence is nothing but mad 
whimsey, we begin to be distracted from the 
fictional dream by our questions, doubts and 










16 Gardner, The Art of Fiction, 56. 
17 Gardner, The Art of Fiction, 168. 





b WRITERS OF FICTION AND WRITERS OF 
CRITICISM 
 
Important theorists of the novel who are also 
practicing novelists have, in general, tended to 
downplay the intellectual aspects of writing in 
favor of the “organic” or holistic side of creative 
composition. Gardner is not the only fiction 
writer who shared strong views on what writing 
is and should be, and if he is still a bit notorious 
today, he is not regarded as particularly 
influential in comparison, say, to Henry James. 
And yet, James was in various ways strikingly 
similar in his views on the purpose of fiction to 
Gardner. He, too, found a certain intellect-
ualizing tendency on the part of critics to mar 
the effect of well-written fiction; a century be-
fore Gardner he was already insisting on the 
necessity of an “organic” form in the novel: “I 
cannot imagine composition existing in a series 
of blocks . . . . A novel is a living thing, all one 
and continuous, like any other organism, and in 
proportion as it lives will it be found, I think, 
that in each of the parts there is something of 
each of the other parts.”18 Like Gardner, James 
prioritized the act of creation, with its 
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18 Henry James, qtd. in Peter Rawlings, American 
Theorists of the Novel (New York: Routledge, 2006), 
23. 
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multiplicity of explorations and dead-ends, over 
the simple transmission of a message, which 
can so easily be “moralistic” and hence, in 
Gardner’s distinction, decidedly not “moral.”  
 “There is one point at which the moral sense 
and the artistic sense lie very near together,” 
James writes. “That is in the light of the very 
obvious truth that the deepest quality of a work 
of art will always be the quality of the mind of 
the producer . . . . No good novel will ever 
proceed from a superficial mind.”19 The tone of 
this declaration, along with the implicit disdain 
for “popular” literature — all of this brings to 
mind On Moral Fiction. And if James rejects the 
“dull dispute over the ‘immoral’ subject and the 
moral,”20  this needs to be understood in its 
context. He developed his most trenchant 
criticisms of the moral/immoral distinction in 
response to the prescriptive and influential 
essay by Walter Besant, “The Art of Fiction,” in 
which Besant declared that fiction ought to 
have “a conscious moral purpose” 21  — 
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19 James, qtd. in Rawlings, American Theorists of the 
Novel, 25. 
20 Henry James, “Preface to ‘The Portrait of a Lady,’” 
in The Art of the Novel: Critical Prefaces by Henry 
James (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 
45. 
21 Walter Besant, qtd. in John Goode, “Walter Besant 
and Henry James,” in Tradition and Tolerance in 
Nineteenth Century Fiction, eds. David Howard, John 
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ambiguous wording, but given that Besant 
insists on proper art being “governed and 
directed by general laws”22 we can be sure he is 
not in agreement with James and Gardner on 
the need for an “organic” development of a 
novel. That there are no clearly delineated 
solutions for moral problems to be found in 
fiction is a recurring argument made by many 
important fiction writers; James is just one of 
the most outspoken of these.  
 This line of thinking recalls Gardner’s (and 
Kundera’s) emphasis on the probing nature of 
fiction. As we have seen, what Gardner calls 
“moral fiction” is at its barest simply the kind of 
fiction that opens up moral questions without 
attempting to answer them from the start. It 
probes; it follows the rules it set out for itself 
instead of following the normative, common 
sense moral commandments of the society 
from which it emerged. Though this is a loose 
and not extraordinarily useful definition, it 
points to an attitude common to many novel-
ists and strangely lacking in many critics who 
are not practitioners of fiction; the attitude of 
“knowing that you don’t know” and being 
content to discover what you have to say 
through your writing, instead of writing 
because you already know what you wish to say. 
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Lucas, and John Goode (New York: Routledge, 
1966), 255 [243–81]. 
22 Besant, qtd. in Goode, “Walter Besant and Henry 
James,” 256.  
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It is a decidedly unacademic way of doing 
things, and that must surely be one of the 
reasons texts like On Moral Fiction prove 
inspiring to novelists but not to critics. David 
Guterson, Raymond Carver, Lore Segal, John 
L’Heureux and many other novelists have paid 
tribute to Gardner (a quick glance at the blurbs 
on copies of Gardner’s didactic books makes 
this clear), but few professional literary critics 
have done the same.  
 Perhaps Albert Camus was playing the role 
of the “serious novelist” when he said in an 
interview, “I don’t claim to teach anybody! 
Whoever thinks this is mistaken. The problems 
confronting young people today are the same 
ones confronting me, that is all. And I am far 
from having solved them.” 23  This kind of 
modesty may well seem a tad disingenuous to a 
critic like John Krapp, who argues that, “Camus 
cannot sincerely evade complicity in the 
morally instructive dimension of his work,”24 
but Camus is only joining the chorus of fiction 
writers whose interest is in asking questions, 
not forcing answers. This is not a difficult 
concept to understand, but it seems deeply 
problematic for critics in that it both 
oversimplifies the many processes going on in a 
“literary text” (James’s novels are not as “easy 
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23 Albert Camus, qtd. in John Krapp, An Aesthetics of 
Morality (Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press, 2002), 76. 
24 Camus, qtd. in Krapp, An Aesthetics of Morality, 76. 
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to read” as one might assume from his 
comments on the need for an intuitive, organic 
flow in fiction) and it confuses the task of 
fiction in general by submitting it to a loose set 
of criteria based on whether it preaches or just 
suggests. In the end, when a novelist like 
Gardner sets out, paradoxically, to preach about 
the need for fiction that does not preach (but 
which still has a moral intent), he is laying bare 
a problem that seems insoluble. He is tackling, 
in a slightly naïve and overbearing way, the 
issue of what art should be doing to its audience 
— an issue that very few people agree on. That 
is why the false modesty of Camus’s comments 
can still seem convincing, or why the vague and 
untheorizable, unprescriptive essays on the 
craft by Henry James and others are never 
completely satisfying. Gardner may have gone 
about things in a heavy-handed and even 
boorish manner when he released On Moral 
Fiction, but the controversy it provoked reveals 
a deep unease in literary criticism with the 
incompatibility between what an author sets 
out to do and what a text becomes in the hands 
of the critic.  
 It is an enormous topic, and in the end it is 
of course not the only reason On Moral Fiction 
has been relegated to the dustbins. Gardner 
raised big issues, and although he dared to 
tackle them in his book, he did not succeed in 
convincing his critics that he was anything 
more than an apologist for a certain literary 
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conservatism. Even Wayne C Booth, whose 
work on the “ethics of fiction” sometimes 
shares a great deal with Gardner’s thought even 
if he seems to downplay this, limited his 
commentary on Gardner to pithy remarks: “It is 
clear that the only acceptable fiction will be 
whatever meets his announced moral stan-
dards.  He always implies that one might arrive 
at his secure judgments by the same logic with 
which he defends them, as if working out a 
simple implied syllogism.”25 This is not a fair 
assessment of On Moral Fiction; it ignores the 
very heart of Gardner’s message — that there is 
no clear-cut, logical way to arrive at moral 
judgments in literature. These judgments must 
be arrived at, quite tentatively, through a 
process that involves writer and reader, 
character and plot, particular and universal. If it 
were a matter of syllogistic deduction, the very 
process of fiction would be a non-art, a 
scientific method.  
 Gardner’s argument, which is unquestion-
ably confused in places, is still not so stern and 
uncompromising that Gardner ought to be 
lumped in with Plato and other “overtly ethical 
critics” who, “having experienced some offering 
that feels unquestionably threatening or 
harmful to the spirit,” try “to damn it as the 
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25 Wayne C. Booth, The Company We Keep (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988), 54. 
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unfailing source of artistic evil.”26 This is carica-
ture. There is little that can legitimately be 
considered normative in what Gardner is 
saying. Yet if there is such a limited 
understanding of what he is saying, then the 
fault must lie with Gardner as well. On Moral 
Fiction would, I think, have benefited from 
some prolonged and serious analyses of at least 
three or four works of fiction; furthermore, it 
might have been wiser on Gardner’s part to 
avoid such a polemical tone. As Foucault puts it, 
the polemicist 
 
proceeds encased in privileges that he 
possesses in advance and will never agree 
to question. On principle, he possesses 
rights authorizing him to wage war and 
making that struggle a just undertaking; 
the person he confronts is not a partner 
in the search for truth, but an adversary, 
an enemy who is wrong, who is harmful 
and whose very existence constitutes a 
threat.27  
 
Gardner fits this description in some of On 
Moral Fiction’s less nuanced passages, and if we 
choose to ignore this problem, we do so in the 
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26 Booth, The Company We Keep, 51. 
27  Michel Foucault, “Polemics, Problems and 
Problematizations: An Interview,” in The Foucault 
Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin, 1991), 
382. 
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knowledge that Gardner, who championed 
taking the greatest care when structuring a 
book, and who insisted on the need to respect 
one’s characters at least during the act of 
writing, often failed to take his own advice in 
the moment of giving the advice. He, too, 
caricatured all the William Gasses and the John 
Barthes with whom he took issue. He, too, 
sometimes reduced his literary adversaries to 
stick figures and straw men. On Moral Fiction, 
according to the definition set forth in it, is not 


























b  GOODNIGHT, GARDNER 
 
Toward the very end of his life, Gardner tried to 
water down the passion with which he’d written 
On Moral Fiction, as if embarrassed by his 
earlier enthusiasm. He eventually summed up 
his entire position very simply: 
 
Every time a really good movie comes 
along . . . everybody starts imitating the 
hero. . . . If the hero or the central 
character in a novel is a whiner who can’t 
get out of bed, who sees nothing but evil 
in the world, who thinks everybody is a 
hypocrite, and so on, the people who 
imitate him are going to destroy 
themselves because they are wrong about 
reality. I think that presenting sort of 
noble models of behavior, which is not to 
say perfect people . . . you give people a 
model for their own lives, for their own 
feelings.28 
 
The pity of this is that although Gardner can 
sound like a “whiner” himself, someone “who 
thinks everybody is a hypocrite,” the most 
salient parts of On Moral Fiction are not only 
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28 Gardner, “Interview with the English Department 
of Pan American University,” 260. 
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inspiring and encouraging, but also deserving of 
a wider audience, an audience that Gardner’s 
didactic books, like On Becoming a Novelist, still 
occasionally find. Gardner, in On Moral Fiction, 
works against himself, and his enthusiasm and 
optimism get ignored along the way. The book, 
once so controversial, is now as good as out of 
print, and many of the authors Gardner picked 
on when he was writing it (Katherine Anne 
Porter, Robert Coover, even John Updike and 
William Gaddis) seem to have faded from 
critical attention significantly. Perhaps this 
should teach us how crucial it is to be humble, 
the way Gardner was not. More generously, we 
could say that Gardner misunderstood his 
audience and his audience misunderstood him. 
There must be some truth to this — the 
example of Wayne C. Booth would demonstrate 
it. But the ultimate test of Gardner’s vision is 
the lasting appeal of the novels written as if 
according to his standards. These are bizarre 
and powerful and memorable in their own 
right, and Gardner’s greatest contribution 
might very well be his idiosyncratic under-
standing of what makes them so strong. 
 But perhaps the sincerest thing that I can do 
for Gardner here is to acknowledge his influ-
ence on me. That is what he would have 
wanted, anyway: for people to “get it” even if he 
hadn’t articulated things particularly well. On 
Moral Fiction, so far as it is remembered from 
time to time, will remain a troubling book for 
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many people — but once in a while he will 
appeal to a young novelist in a profound way, 
far more profoundly than those who ridicule 
Gardner might suspect. It remains a wordless 
thing, of course. Take away the Good, the True, 
the Beautiful and all of that pseudo-theorizing 
and you are left with an experienced, flawed 
novelist asking people to remember to like life, 













Booth, Wayne C. 1988. The Company We Keep. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Foucault, Michel. 1991. “Polemics, Problems 
and Problematizations: An Interview.” In 
The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow. 
London: Penguin. 
 
Gardner, John. [1978] 2000. On Moral Fiction. 
New York: Basic Books. 
 
Gardner, John. 1990. “Interview with John 
Gardner, English Department of Pan 
American University (1981).” In 
Conversations with John Gardner, ed. Allan 
Chavkin. Jackson: University Press of 
Mississippi. 
 
Gardner, John. 1991. The Art of Fiction: Notes on 
Craft for Young Writers. New York: Vintage. 
 
Goode, John. 1966. “Walter Besant and Henry 




Nineteenth Century Fiction, eds. David 
Howard, John Lucas, and John Goode. New 
York: Routledge. 243–81. 
 
Hegel, Georg W. F. 1977. The Phenomenology of 
Spirit, trans. Arthur V. Miller. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977. 
 
Hopkins, Gerard Manley. 1935. The 
Correspondence of Gerard Manley Hopkins and 
Richard Watson Dixon, ed. Claude C. Abbot. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
James, Henry. 2011. The Art of the Novel: 
Critical Prefaces by Henry James. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Krapp, John. 2002. An Aesthetics of Morality. 
Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press. 
 
Kundera, Milan. 2007. The Curtain: An Essay in 
Seven Parts, trans. Linda Asher. London: 
Faber and Faber. 
 
Rawlings, Peter. 2006. American Theorists of the 
Novel. New York: Routledge. 
 
Silesky, Barry. 2004. John Gardner: Literary 















W. dreams, like Phaedrus, of an army of 
thinker-friends, thinker-lovers. He dreams 
of a thought-army, a thought-pack, which 
would storm the philosophical Houses of 
Parliament. He dreams of Tartars from the 
philosophical steppes, of thought-
barbarians, thought-outsiders. What 
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